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The market model ofreligion asserts in part that clergy respond to incentives. 
For eighteenth-century European established churches, clergy income was inde­
pendent ofchurch membership and so clergy tended not to behave in a manner 
attractive to potential members. By contrast, the established Congregational 
(puritan) church ofcolonial Connecticut featured a structure that rewarded to a 
significant degree zealous clergy. Clergy were hired and fired at the local level 
by community members who also voted on local clerical taxes. The market model 
thus predicts relatively strong church membership. Archival data show that the 
number ofnew Puritan congregation members as a share ofpopulation remained 
relatively constant over time. The number ofnew members of individual estab­
lished congregations remained constant. Church membership was often high in 
colonial Connecticut towns. Entry by nonestablished congregations had only a 
modest negative effect on Puritan membership. 
THE MARKET MODEL 
E
stablished churches have a bad reputation among economists and sociologists, a 
reputation whose source is linked closely to the market model ofreligion. The mar­
ket model describes and analyzes religion in general and established churches in 
particular. The model in tum owes much of its origin to Adam Smith's An Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes ofthe Wealth ofNations (1979[1784]). Not only is it one of the defin­
ing books in economics, Wealth ofNations contains important passages about religion. 
Smith described the organization and motives of a church in much the same way econo­
mists describe the organization and motives of finns. Importantly, Smith made the spe­
cific prediction that because they earn a wage guaranteed by the state, clergy in an estab­
lished church will not work as hard to attract members as will clergy in nonestablished 
churches (who must attract members in order to prosper). As a consequence, an estab­
lished church's clergy eventually will lose touch with the masses and be unable to respond 
effectively to competition from nonestablished churches. 
Using the eighteenth-century Church ofEngland as a case in point, Smith argued, "The 
clergy of an established and well-endowed religion frequently become men of learning 
and elegance, who possess all the virtues of gentlemen; but they are apt gradually to lose 
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the qualities, both good and bad, which gave them authority and influence with the infe­
rior ranks ofpeople." Established faiths, when faced with new sectarian competition, will 
thus invariably lose out. As Smith said, "in general every religious sect, when it has once 
enjoyed for a century or two the security of a legal establishment, has found itself inca­
pable ofmaking any vigorous defense against any new sect which chose to attack its doc­
trine or discipline. Upon such occasions the advantage in point of learning and good writ­
ing may sometimes be on the side of the established church. But the arts ofpopularity, all 
the arts of gaining proselytes, are constantly on the side of its adversaries" (789). Such 
was the case in eighteenth century England, where "those arts [of gaining followers] have 
been long neglected by the well-endowed clergy ofthe established church, and are at pres­
ent chiefly cultivated by the dissenters and by the Methodists." As a result, the Methodists 
in particular were greatly "in vogue" (789). 
The first explicit use of Smith's prediction about the effect of establishment on the reli­
gious market is by Iannaccone (1991) who shows in part that contemporary church atten­
dance is much lower in established Protestant (mainly Scandinavian) Western European 
nations than in nonestablished Western European Protestant nations and the United States. 
Chaves and Cann (1992) support this result using a slightly different set of countries and 
different criteria for establishment and for government regulation ofthe church. Finke and 
Stark (1992) (and earlier Stark and Finke 1988) assert that u.S. church membership grew 
dramatically after a colonial period characterized by low church membership caused by 
monopoly established churches that had no motivation to attract new members. Finke 
(1990) emphasizes the role deregulation played in increasing denominational diversity 
and total membership in colonial America beginning in the late 1700s. Similarly, 
Hamberg and Pettersson (1994) show that religious commitment is stronger for members 
of nonestablished churches than for members of the established church in contemporary 
Sweden. Stark and Iannaccone (1994) explain the secularization of Europe as a conse­
quence ofestablishment. Iannaccone, Finke, and Stark (1997) review key examples ofthe 
effect of establishment on religious markets in Europe, Japan, and the United States. This 
body of research is not without critics. Bruce (1995a, 1995b), Hadaway and Marler 
(1996), and Lechner (1996) question various aspects of Smith's prediction and the data 
used to test it. 
Most ofthe existing research emphasizes potential weaknesses of established churches." 
Must established churches necessarily fail to attract members? The answer is no, of 
course. Nothing about the market model mandates that established church clergy be indif­
ferent to members. The market model as defined by economists has as its foundation the 
straightforward assertion that individuals tend to respond to incentives (rewards). Adam 
Smith applied this market model in describing the Church of England. The Church of 
England failed, not because it was established per se, but because its clergy's "exertion, 
their zeal and industry" were likely to be less because their income was derived from "a 
landed estate, a tythe or land tax, an established salary or stipend" rather than "the volun­
tary contributions of their hearers" (788). In other words, Smith recognized that the struc­
ture and organization of the established Church of England, and by extension the estab­
lished churches ofthe remainder ofEurope, did not reward zealous clergy, did not provide 
an incentive to attract members. 
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Not all established churches imitate Europe, however. The colonial Connecticut 
Congregational (puritan) church is an example of an established church with a structure 
that created incentives very different from the European model, incentives that rewarded 
in significant ways clergy who could attract committed members and could respond to 
competition from other churches. In this circumstance, the market model predicts stronger 
membership. 
This paper's next section examines the structure of the Connecticut establishment. 
Subsequent sections draw upon a unique set of data on church membership, data that 
reveal established Connecticut congregations able to attract a consistent and surprisingly 
high number of new members as a proportion of the colony's population, even in the face 
of growing competition from nonestablished churches at the end of the colonial period. 
THE ESTABLISHED CHURCH IN COLONIAL CONNECTICUT 
Connecticut churches began less as established than as sectarian institutions. Having 
rejected the hierarchy and inclusiveness ofthe parent established Church ofEngland, they 
were founded upon sectarian ideals of local group control and cohesiveness and of exclu­
sive, restrictive membership. The formation of the First Church of Milford provides an 
illustration. Milford First was founded by families who had either followed Peter Prodden, 
the minister, from England or had been attracted to him by his charismatic preaching in 
America. Prodden and several other men began holding private religious meetings in 1638 
in anticipation of founding a church.In 1639, he and his followers established the com­
munity and church of Milford. Seven men, Prodden among them,- became the congrega­
tion's first members, its "pillars," by signing a written covenant binding them and future 
members. A key decision by the pillars was to restrict membership to individuals who 
could demonstrate experience and knowledge of faith to the satisfaction of current mem­
bers. Membership was neither automatic at birth nor simply open to all who wished it. 
Once the Milford church was gathered, Prodden was formally ordained by the member­
ship. Since under Puritanism the individual church controlled the local clerical office, no 
ecclesiastical hierarchy was involved in Prodden's ordination ceremony. 
Common features of New England congregations included organization at the local 
level by small groups of individuals, including a minister, whose interests were identical. 
Membership was highly restrictive, being confined to people who could demonstrate an 
experience of conversion and knowledge of faith to the satisfaction of current members 
and ministers. Participation in the two sacraments of the church was also highly restric­
tive. Only those people who could pass the test of faith could partake of the sacrament of 
the Eucharist, and only those children who were born to the "elect" could receive the 
sacrament of baptism. While New England congregations could vary the strictness of the 
test of admission, virtually all required of new members some significant public profes­
sion of faith and acceptance ofdoctrine. Whether town residents presented themselves for 
admission, however, was a matter of individual choice. 
From the beginning, Connecticut congregationalism enjoyed established status in two 
respects-state prohibition of religious competition and taxpayer support of the local min­
ister. In the early colonial period, Connecticut law tolerated no religious competition. The 
state allowed only one church and one minister per parish or town, and that church and 
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minister had to be congregational. In addition the town taxed all residents, church and 
non-church members alike, for the support of the minister and upkeep of the meeting­
house. Further, all town inhabitants, regardless of membership status, had to attend 
Sabbath services; anyone failing to do so was fined. As one historian has argued, early 
New England Puritanism was a dual religious system: "the state served as church and the 
congregations served as sects within it. The state made it possible for the churches to serve 
as sectarians by keeping the entire community in line with God's laws and by serving 
many of the roles normally fulfilled by the church" (Pope 1970:105). The Connecticut 
establishment did not, however, perfectly mimic those of Europe. Ministers were hired 
(ordained) by the congregation, and fired (dismissed) by the congregation and clerical 
taxes were voted and disbursed locally. 
After 1690, Connecticut congregationalism became in some ways more church-like, 
and more like the English establishment the early Puritans had left behind. Puritan con­
gregations become more inclusive. The Half-Way Covenant was introduced and widely 
adopted, allowing the children of members to join the church "half-way" and to obtain 
baptism for their children by providing evidence of doctrinal knowledge but not of con­
version. Consequently, the number ofbaptisms escalated and the number of children sub­
ject to church discipline increased substantially. Soon some churches allowed individuals 
without enchurched parents to become "half-way" members. Tests of faith were weakened 
or even dispensed with, so that in many congregations morality became the sole criterion 
for church membership and participation in the Lord's Supper. 
Just as church membership was broadened, so church polity and the religious estab­
lishment changed over time. Lay control over admission and ordination diminished, giv­
ing way increasingly to the exercise ofclerical prerogative over the processes. New neigh­
borhood associations of clergy appeared, and licensed and advised congregations on pas­
toral candidates. In 1708, Connecticut adopted the Saybrook Platform, which "added sub­
stantially to the minister's authority" and, along with the Half-Way Covenant, "imbued 
Connecticut churches with much of the strength of the establishment in Scotland and 
England" (Bushman 1967: 151). The Platform organized the congregations of each coun­
ty into consociations dominated by clergy, which sought to buttress church discipline and 
clerical authority against local dissent. If it ignored a consociation decision, a congrega­
tion lost the right to raise taxes to support its minister. As historian Richard Bushman 
argues, "a century after settlement Puritanism had reverted to many ofthe practices of the 
very Establishment the Puritans had once sought to escape" (1967:147). 
Although they sought to enlarge their authority, Connecticut ministers were neverthe­
less heavily reliant on local good will for their success. In this sense the Connecticut 
establishment did not make the transition to the European mode. In 1699, the Connecticut 
Assembly voted to extend the right to vote on the selection and dismissal of ministers to 
every inhabitant of a parish, church member or not. Thereafter, local majorities increas­
ingly insinuated themselves into the processes of hiring and firing ministers, rights once 
reserved for church members. Concomitantly, disputes between pastors and parishioners 
rose sharply, as did the number ofministers dismissed from pulpits (Schmotter 1975:256­
257). The major source of both disputes and dismissals was salaries. In the period 1700­
1750, conflict over salary accounted for over half of local controversies, as taxpayers, 
already overburdened by currency inflation and the expense ofAnglo-French wars fought 
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in the colonies, short-shrifted ministerial salaries and resisted clerical requests for ade­
quate maintenance. Conflict over theology also lay behind the rise in dismissals. Before 
the 1699 law was enacted, ministers had only congregation members to keep happy. Now 
they had to please everyone. The Connecticut establishment contained new incentives for 
clergymen to attract merrlbers, and starting in the early 1700s, Connecticut ministers 
adopted a new evangelism to do just that, courting the good will and soliciting the con­
version of all townspeople. 
At the same time, Connecticut churches faced rising competition from new, nonestab­
lished sects, including Baptists, Quakers, Anglicans, and Separatists (McLoughlin 1971). 
In 1708, the Connecticut Assembly, under pressure from England, where religious tolera­
tion had been legislated in 1689, voted to allow Protestant dissenters to worship separate­
ly, although they had to obtain permission from the county court to do so and still had to 
pay taxes to the local established ministry. In 1727 and 1729, the Assembly granted 
Anglicans and Baptists freedom from paying taxes and left them on their own to support 
their worship. However, as Richard Bushman points out, "The exemption took different 
forms. Anglicans, who believed in establishment, received a portion of the minister's tax 
proportional to their numbers. The Baptists and Quakers, rejecting the conception, were 
simply freed from paying taxes and left to their own devices to support their worship" 
(Bushman 1967:168). Henceforth, Connecticut tolerated rising religious diversity within 
broad limits. By 1776, there were twenty-five Baptist congregations in Connecticut, 
where only one had existed in the seventeenth century. There were also thirty-six Anglican 
congregations in the colony (the first, Greenwich Episcopal, was founded in 1705), and 
twenty-seven separatist Puritan congregations (congregations formed from the Great 
Awakening). The Quakers made few inroads in the colony. 
Despite the growth of ecclesiastical diversity, social pressures to join the established 
church nevertheless persisted, albeit in attenuated form. Although Connecticut never fol­
lowed the lead of Massachusetts in limiting the franchise and office holding to church 
membership, the church was still an instrument of political advancement. Voters, for 
example, favored the elect over the nonelect for public office, although towns' preference 
for church members as leaders weakened over time (Cook 1976:120-131). Further, so 
long as congregationalism and the parish remained synonymous for most people, the 
established church was the dominant religious force in the rituals of everyday life. 
For most periods, more women than men joined the church (both as half-way and full 
members) and at earlier ages, and admission to a church often followed marriage and 
coincided with childbirth. Women who joined the church after marriage tended to do so 
upon the birth of a first or second child, seeking to fulfill the prerequisite for these and 
subsequent childrens' baptism (Moran 1980:55-65). Only during the Great Awakening 
was admission to membership less a function ofthe rites ofadulthood than ofthe passages 
of adolescence, as numerous new members, males as well as females, were single and 
under the age of twenty at admission (Moran 1991:56-57; 1993:51). 
To summarize, the colonial Connecticut Puritan church was similar to European estab­
lishments in that it enjoyed state-protected monopoly status for much of the colonial period 
and taxpayer support for the entire colonial period. Unlike European establishments and 
despite clergy efforts to gain more control, local congregation members and then the com­
munity retained and routinely exercised the power to hire and fire clergy and set clergy 
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salaries. Puritan church members enjoyed special social status reinforced by the selectivity 
of membership. In the latter colonial period, the Puritan church faced increasing competi­
tion from non-Puritan congregations, some of which were also taxpayer supported. 
DATA 
The data we employ to test the market model are annual totals of new male and female 
members for fifty-three Puritan congregations in colonial Connecticut from 1639 to 1776. 
The data were collected by the authors from archival church membership records in 
Connecticut and represent a depth and breadth of information of unequaled value. No 
equivalent data for colonial American church membership exists. These fifty-three con­
gregations represent between roughly ten and fifty percent of the total number of congre­
gations in the colony, depending on the year. 
Most historical analysis ofreligion in the colonial period relies on fragmentary evidence 
contained in publications like religious tracts and sermons and in a relatively small num­
ber of diaries and letters. Such sources are valuable in their own way, but are subject to 
the biases and misperceptions ofthe individual writers. By contrast, membership data like 
these represent the revealed documented preferences of a substantial share of the popula­
tion of colonial Connecticut. 
Some writers question the appropriateness of membership as a measure of religious 
commitment, in particular since membership might not be a measure of the intensity of 
religious belief or actual church attendance. The latter issue is not relevant since church 
attendance was mandatory. The former is a legitimate concern but is less relevant in colo­
nial Connecticut than for contemporary congregations. Because membership in colonial 
Connecticut Puritan congregations was limited to those who openly professed faith and 
were approved by existing members and/or ministers, a level of commitment is indicated 
in the colonial Connecticut church that might not be so in other colonies or in modem con­
gregations where membership is largely unrestricted. 
Regardless of whether membership measures the intensity of religious belief, the focus 
in this paper is on the question of whether or not churches could attract members not on 
the intensity of belief of members and non-members. In other words, we seek to under­
stand the extent to which the church as a firm provided a mix ofproducts and services that 
attracted members regardless of their underlying strength of belief: just as economists 
model firms providing products desired by consumers without focusing on the underlying 
strength of consumer preferences. 
The data used here are not without problems, of course. We do not know in most cases 
total membership for each congregation. Although attendance at services was mandatory, 
only those who satisfactorily proved their faith were allowed membership. The data also 
do not include all congregations, especially the non-Puritan and Separatist Puritan con­
gregations that appeared in the later colonial period. As such, the congregations for which 
data are available are not a random sample. Further, the data come only from a single 
colony and do not necessarily represent all of the colonies or Puritanism as an intercolo­
nial entity, although they arguably do represent Puritan New England. Nevertheless, the 
reported congregations are located in all parts ofthe colony, cover the entire colonial peri­
od, and include areas with diverse population densities. 
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TRENDS IN NEW PURITAN CHURCH MEMBERSHIP 
The market model predicts that clergy who are rewarded for attracting members are 
more likely to try to do so. The European establishments, as Smith and others noted, did 
not reward zealous clergy. The colonial Connecticut establishment, by contrast, was struc­
tured in a way that provided significant incentives for clergy to attract members. We pre­
dict, therefore, that membership patterns should be much stronger for Puritan congrega­
tions than Smith and others describe for European-type establishments. We expect to see 
rising or at least constant membership over time as a proportion of the population eligible 
for membership. We expect competition from nonestablished churches to have little or no 
significant negative impact on Puritan church membership as a share of population in the 
years after entry by nonestablished churches is permitted. We expect Puritan church 
membership to be a significant proportion of the population eligible for membership, 
reflecting the incentive of clergy to attract members. 
Note, however, we do not expect membership to be as strong as would occur in an 
unregulated religious market. Even the Connecticut establishment's structure did not pro­
vide a perfect connection between membership and clergy compensation. Further, we are 
studying congregations over a period of more than one hundred years. Any organization 
that can remain vital and responsive over that span is exceptional. Finke and Stark (1992) 
assert, for example, that churches tend to lose their evangelical energy over time, inde­
pendent of being established. 
Much of our data measure new members of Puritan congregations rather than the total 
number of members. Nevertheless, a congregation with shrinking total membership is 
unlikely to attract growing numbers of new members. Similarly, a congregation whose 
membership is growing likely does so by attracting new members. 
The most obvious way to test the prediction that membership will remain strong given 
our data is to regress new members per reporting church on time for the period 1639-1776. 
For that regression, the coefficient on a variable for the year is positive (0.010) but not sta­
tistically significarit (p = 0.25). 
Using raw new membership data, however, does not account for changes in population 
or changes in the number of reporting churches. We therefore use our data to create a new 
variable that estimates the annual total number of new Puritan church members per one 
thousand population in Connecticut. The variable is calculated by assuming that all 
Puritan congregations are adding the same number of members as the average of congre­
gations for which data are available. We then divide this estimate of total new members 
by Connecticut population in thousands. For example, in 1730 the thirty-four congrega­
tions for which data are available added an average of 6.5 members. Since there were one 
hundred and one total Puritan congregations in that year, we estimate that a total of656.5 
members were added in the colony. Connecticut's population is estimated to be 75,530 in 
1730, so we conclude that Puritan congregations added 8.69 new members per thousand 
population in 1730. 
The data we report begin in the year 1670. We have data for so few towns in the peri­
od 1639 to 1669 that new member estimates are highly problematic. By 1670 however, 
we have data for six ofthe twenty-one congregations extant and the estimate is much more 
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stable. In subsequent years, data for an increasing number of congregations are available. 
Figure 1 shows a graph ofannual data from 1670 to 1775. For reference, the mean of the 
entire series is drawn as a horizontal line at 7.2 new members per thousand population. 
FIGURE 1 
New Puritan Members per 1000 Population 
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Note the dramatic upward sp~kes in the graph in 1741-2. The years 1741 and 1742 are 
the primary years of the Great Awakening. This was a momentous religious event in the 
colonies, New England especially. A significant characteristic of the period was evangel­
ical efforts by independent nonestablished clergy, like George Whitefield, as noted by 
Finke and Iannaccone (1993). Data for fifty congregations are available and a substantial 
share witnessed significant increases in membership~ Referring to the graph overall, new 
membership per congregation rises up to the Great Awakening, and then steps downward. 
The decrease in new members after the Great Awakening. is substantially explained as 
individuals who joined during the Great Awakening but would othetwise have joined in 
subsequent years. The average number of new members per thousand population in the 
ten years before the Great Awakening (1731-40) is 11.5. In the following ten years, which 
include the Great Awakening (1741-1750), the average number is 10.7. As noted before, 
Puritan congregations relaxed their age expectation for membership during the Great 
Awakening. 
The average number ofmembers added per year for the entire period between 1670 and 
1776 is 7.2. Adding an average ofonly 7.2 members per thousand population per year may 
seem like a trivial number, but is more dian enough to yield substantial total membership, 
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especially given the limitations on population eligible for membership, an issue addressed 
later. No obvious trend for the entire period is evident and the graph shows substantial 
year-to-year variation. 
This approach with time as the only independent variable may be supplemented with 
other data. What additional factors might have influenced new membership? A previous 
analysis of Woodbury is suggestive. As that paper's multiple regression analysis shows, 
religious activity as measured by new full and half-way members and baptisms was affect­
ed by regional conditions like the colonial economy and the Great Awakening (Hull and 
Moran 1989). To test the effect of competition on Puritan congregations, we include a 
count of nonestablished congregations. This variable includes Baptist and Anglican 
(Episcopal) as well as Separatist Puritan congregations. Table 1 shows summary results 
from multiple regression analysis. 
Table 1
 
Time Series Regression Analysis of New Puritan Members
 
Dependent Variable is New Puritan Members per 1000 Population
 













































N 106 106 106 105 
AdjusteJlR2 0.682 0.647 0.590 0.639 
Equation p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Durbin-Watson 1.35· 1.2~ 1.0411 1.97' 
p-values for coefficients in parentheses.
 
-Autoco"elation. At 1% level (Ie'-5, n=100) reject Ho: p=O when dw<1.44.
 
'Autoco"elation. At 1% level (Ie'-4, n=100) reject Ho: p=O when dw<1.46.
 
~No QUloco"elation. At 1% level (Ie'=5, n-100) reject Ho: p=O when dw<1.65.
 
Regression equation #1 incorporates the variables suggested above. The dependent 
variable is our estimated average number of new Puritan members per one thousand pop­
ulation. The regression coefficients show that during each of the two years of the Great 
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Awakening, twenty-nine members are added per thousand population. Those years with 
an improving economy reduce the average number of new members per thousand popu­
lation by 1.2. These results are similar to the earlier Woodbury research. An increase in 
nonestablished competition reduces established Puritan new membership, but only mod­
estly. The addition of one nonestablished congregation reduces the average number of 
new Puritan members by only 0.11 per thousand population. Finally, the coefficient on the 
Year variable shows a small but statistically significant positive trend. 
These regression results support the market model's prediction about the strength of 
Connecticut's established church. However, equation #1 suffers from two problems com­
mon to time series data: serial correlation and multicollinearity. The latter occurs due to 
the strong correlation between the Year and Separatist Congregations variables (r =0.87). 
Regression equations #2 and #3 drop these two variables in tum. Without the Year vari­
able, the coefficient on the Nonestablished Congregations variable in equation #2 shrinks 
further but remains statistically significant. Without the Nonestablished Congregations 
variable, the coefficient on the Year variable in equation #3 becomes negative but has 
weaker statistical significance. 
The first three equations show significant serial correlation as shown by the values for 
the Durbin-Watson statistics. To address the problem of serial correlation, we employ a 
generalized least squares model. The dependent and each of the independent variables is 
transformed by subtracting from each observation its lagged value weighted by a value 
based on the Durbin-Watson statistic: X = Xt - ~Xt.l where ~ = 1 - dw/2. GLS regression 
results are summarized in the last column of Table 1. Coefficients are similar to equation 
#1 but the GLS regression does not suffer from serial correlation. 
We draw three conclusions from regressions on all reporting congregations for the colo­
nial period. Competition from non-Puritan congregations seems to have had a very mod­
est negative affect on new Puritan membership. Evidence suggests that Puritan congrega­
tions were able to add members at a rate equal to the growth in population at least up to 
the Revolution. Consistent here, note that Olds (1994) finds no significant change in 
Connecticut Puritan church membership after its disestablishment. Finally, the Puritan 
church participated strongly in the Great Awakening, adding dramatically more members 
than during any other time in the colonial period. This latter suggests that established con­
gregations had a desire and were able to recruit members during a period characterized by 
significant nonestablished evangelical activity. 
NEW MEMBERSHIP BY AGE OF CONGREGATION 
The combined average ofnew members added for all colonial Connecticut Puritan con­
gregations remains relatively constant over time. Aggregating membership numbers 
across congregations, however, may mask trends in individual congregations. As the his­
torical discussion above shows, the Puritan "church" is more appropriately characterized 
as a collection of relatively autonomous congregations. As such, trends in the established 
church might be more accurately reflected at the congregational level. Two additional 
potentially useful approaches are pursued here that might reveal the effect of the age of a 
particular congregation on membership. That is, we examine particular established con­
gregations rather than the established church in general. First we take a cross-sectional 
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"snapshot" across all congregations in 1775. Second, we create a sequential data set for 
all congregations based on the number ofyears since the congregations were gathered. An 
additional benefit of these approaches is that they eliminate problems of serial correlation 
because they do not use time series data. 
FIGURE 2 
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Figure 2 is a scatter diagram with the number of new members on the vertical axis and 
the years since the congregation was founded on the horizontal axis. Each point in the dia­
gram is one congregation for which membership data are available. The year 1775 is cho­
sen because it represents congregations on the eve ofthe Revolution and includes very old 
as well as quite young congregations. 
Each point in the scatter diagram represents for one congregation the number of years 
since that congregation was gathered and the number of members the congregation adds 
in 1776. For example, in the upper right-hand comer of the graph is a point for 
Westerfield, which added twenty-five members and" was 134 years old in 1775. The sec­
ond highest number of members, fifteen, was added by West Hartford which was sixty­
two years old. An ordinary least squares regression with the year since each congrega­
tion was gathered as the independent variable and new members for each congregation as 
the dependent variable yields a positive coefficient on the year variable (0.048) but the 
value is only marginally significant (p = 0.077). Older congregations added at least as 
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As a second test, in Figure 3 we rearrange all of the congregations so that the first data 
case is the number of members added in all the reporting congregations' first year. 
Subsequent cases are subsequent years in sequence. For example, the first case in the data 
set includes Woodbury, which added three members in its first year (1668), Middletown, 
which added twelve members in its first year (1670), and additional observations for all 
of the towns for which data are available in the year the congregation was gathered. The 
total number ofnew members is divided by the number of reporting congregations, yield­
ing an average of 7.3 members added for congregations in their first year since founding 
(year 0). Note that data are not available for all congregations from the year they were 
gathered. Thus the first year does not contain the full fifty-three congregations. Note also 
that the number of congregations in the data set falls as the year since founded increases 
since congregations are founded throughout the colonial period. 
In the figure, the mean number of new members (6.0) for all years is drawn in as a ref­
erence. No apparent trend appears in the data at least for the first hundred or so years. 
After that, the data seem to step downward until age 130 or so and then spike sharply 
upward. Interestingly, the largest average number of members is added at age 133. This is 
a somewhat anomalous result however. It is due to a large number of members added by 
two congregations, Hew Haven and Westerfield, in a part of the data series where only 
three congregations are in the sample. Remember that very few congregations span the 
full number of years in the sequence. The same potential problem is present after 110 
years since only seven congregations are represented. 
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In order to test for a long-term trend, we calculate an ordinary least squares regression 
with the average number of new members added per reporting congregation as the 
dependent variable and the years since founded as the independent variable. As before, no 
trend emerges. The coefficient on the Year variable is positive (0.0079) but not statistically 
significant (p = 0.253). Regressions using weighted least squares to deal with the poten­
tial heteroskedasticity due to small sample size in the later years show no difference in the 
results. As before, older Puritan congregations added at least as many new members as 
younger congregations. 
TOTAL MEMBERSHIP AS A SHARE OF POPULATION 
While they yield compelling results, the data examined to this point only measure new 
church members. Our data on total church membership are more limited. Table 2 sum­
marizes church membership as a proportion ofpopulation in selected Connecticut towns. 
The data are compiled from town archives for selected years between 1675 and 1729. 
Numbers in the body of the table are the percent of adult males or the percent of families 
who are members of the Puritan congregation in the town. The bottom row ofthe table is 
the population-weighted average of membership proportion for all of the reporting towns 
in that year. Membership shows substantial variation from town to town. In terms of aver­
ages for all reporting towns, the .sample is too small for reliable generalizations, but no 
downward trend is apparent. 
Colonial historians have compiled· some additional membership data. Lockridge 
(1967:409,411) examines town records for Dedham and reports that seventy percent of 
the town's taxpayers were church members in 1648 and thirty-six percent of adult male 
inhabitants were communicants in 1670. Moran (1979) uses local records, including tax 
lists, to determine membership in Milford over a number of years. In 1643, eighty-two 
percent of men receiving land, seventy-seven percent of all inhabitants' wives, and sev­
enty-eight percent of male inhabitants were church members. In 1660, seventy-three per­
cent ofmale inhabitants were members. Eighty percent ofmen who arrived between 1644 
and 1654 and stayed in town eventually became members. In 1669, thirty-six percent of 
adult males were members. Of all inhabitants, membership was forty-seven percent in 
1678, forty-six percent in 1687, and forty-three percent in 1712. 
. In reviewing these data, it is essential to highlight the nature of the appropriate market 
from which the calculation ofmembership is made. Children were not allowed to become 
Puritan church members. Teenagers rarely became members, except during the Great 
Awakening. Further, most adults were allowed to join the church only after they had 
fonned a household and had become parents. For example, during the seventeenth-centu­
ry in New England, ninety percent of new members were over the age of twenty, and 
eighty percent were married (Moran 1980). Although there was variation across congre­
gations and variation over time, church membership was almost always restricted to 
adults. In assessing the ability of Puritan congregations to attract members, the relevant 
market definition includes only adults (defined as those age twenty-one or older), since 
only they were allowed to become members. The contrast with contemporary denomina­
tions is apparent since few limit membership only to those age twenty-one or older. 
177 
This issue is especially important given the age distribution in Connecticut. In 1774 for 
example, fifty-seven percent of the population was age twenty or younger (Hoadly 
1890:485-91). In other words, of every one thousand population, only about 430 people 
were eligible for membership. Further, membership was restricted only to those who 
demonstrated a level of religious commitment satisfactory to current members and clergy, 
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A final observation in evaluating the available data on membership rates relates to 
membership and gender. Table 2 and much ofthe other data only report male membership. 
Since the ratio of males to females in Connecticut for much of the colonial period is close 
to one, simply using the male data for the entire membership estimate might seem appro­
priate. However, in colonial Connecticut (as in most American churches) female members 
significantly outnumbered male members. Our archival data show that about fifty-eight 
percent of new members were female. This being the case, the actual membership was 
higher as a proportion of population than the data for males reported in Table 2. 
Based on our understanding ofthe fraction ofpopulation eligible for membership, given 
data on membership in selected towns, and recognizing gender differences in member­
ship, we conclude that in colonial Connecticut a substantial fraction of the relevant popu­
lation were church members. This result is consistent with the predictions·of the market 
model applied to the Connecticut establishment. 
CONCLUSION 
The available data on church membership in colonial Connecticut provide a valuable 
and valid resource for testing the market model of religion as applied to established 
churches. Our data show that established Puritan church new membership as a proportion 
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of colonial population rose steadily (albeit modestly) before the Great Awakening, and 
increased dramatically during it. Further, total church membership was often high in colo­
nial Connecticut towns as a proportion of those potentially eligible for membership. The 
data also show only a slight decline in Puritan church new membership in the face ofnon­
Puritan competition. 
Economists start with certain propositions about human behavior and motivation and 
proceed to outline predictions based on the incentives and constraints in a given situation. 
In the case of the religious market, clergy in a centrally-controlled and taxed established 
church would be expected to be insensitive to church members. This is the situation 
described by Adam Smith for the Church of England. A careful examination of the colo­
nial Connecticut establishment suggests an incentive structure that puts considerable pres­
sure on clergy to respond to member preferences. 
First, virtually all of the colonial Puritan congregations were founded by a relatively 
small number of individuals, often including a minister, with common religious views. 
The example of Milford First applies here. The founders can be thought of as entrepre­
neurs creating a new established congregation. The congregation was formed because of 
the common views held by the founders, and the clergy were part of that formation. The 
interests of clergy and members were one. 
Second, once a congregation was founded, congregation members retained the author­
ity to hire and fire clergy, vote on local congregation tax rates, and set clergy salaries. 
Later some of this power moved into the hands of the community at large. Thus the local 
congregation membership and community retained considerable power over clergy and so 
provided incentives to clergy much different than for clergy in the European establish­
ments. 
Third, congregation and community members could and did vote with their feet by 
moving away from communities with unacceptable ministers or doctrine. Such movement 
reduced the tax base of an existing congregation and must surely have been a concern for 
ministers. 
Finally, even established congregations relied to a limited extent on pew sales and 
rentals and on donations (Olds 1994). These supplemental sources of support would obvi­
ously be affected by the ability of the minister to respond to the membership. 
The colonial Puritan establishment was in important ways like a farm coop or housing 
condominium arrangement where members mutually agreed to be taxed or pay fees to 
support common goals, in this case the local minister and meetinghouse. This arrange­
ment is much more responsive to demographic changes ,and popular preferences than an 
establishment where a centralized bureaucratic church administers religion, financial 
incentives for zealous clergy are minimal, and competition for adherents practically non­
existent. In Connecticut, competition for new members arose within an established frame­
work. 
The focus ofthis paper is on church membership and the effect incentives have on cler­
gy behavior toward members. We have not examined the incentives of individuals to 
become members or, as mentioned early in the paper, the level of commitment of mem­
bers. Both of these issues relate to the demand side of the religious market, to which we 
have given little attention. Our lack of attention is not, however, meant to suggest that 
these issues are unimportant. 
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In fact, any number of churches in general are, and the colonial Connecticut Puritan 
church in particular was attractive to members for reasons other than doctrinal character­
istics. Individuals join churches to maintain or increase social status, to enhance well­
being, and to receive other ofwhat sociologist call compensators and what economists call 
valuable goods and services. Ellison and Sherkat (1995a) and Sherkat and Wilson (1995) 
provide a recent overview of the sociological perspective and Hull and Bold (1989) pro­
vide an economics view. Individuals can even join churches "semi-involuntarily" because 
of social pressure from various sources (Ellison and Sherkat 1995b). Certainly Puritan 
church members formed the social elite in colonial New England and individuals must 
have wanted to ally themselves with this elite. The restrictions on new membership pre­
vented all of those who wished to join from doing so, however, while at the same time 
reinforcing the unique status and appeal of membership. 
Those same restrictions on membership very likely raised the level of commitment of 
members and reinforced the strength of the Puritan church. As Iannaccone (1992, 1994) 
shows, strict churches are stronger than other churches and are better able to provide 
important collective goods to members. Puritan congregations required their members to 
demonstrate a level of commitment higher than most contemporary mainline congrega­
tions in the United States where membership is relatively unrestricted. Even more dra­
matic is the difference between the Connecticut establishment and established churches 
in, for example, the Scandinavian countries. As Hamberg and Pettersson (1994) note, 
membership in the contemporary Swedish established church is automatic at birth. It takes 
an effort on the part of an individual to relinquish_ membership in that church. Member 
attendance at services is optional. Clergy are part of a centralized state bureaucracy. Not 
surprisingly, the level of member religious commitment (measured in part by attendance) 
is low. The contrast to the Connecticut Puritan church is clear. Puritan church attendance 
was mandatory, but membership required a significant demonstrated level ofcommitment 
and was typically open only to adults with families. 
Colonial Connecticut Puritan congregations likely encouraged in their members a rela­
tively high level of commitment and provided members a variety of reasons to join other 
than pure doctrine. These two additional important factors reinforce the strength of the 
Connecticut establishment and are complementary to issues addressed in this paper. 
Clergy who relied on local support obviously would care that the church provided what­
ever compensators that encouraged members, especially strongly committed members, to 
join. 
On the other hand, the Puritan church failed to expand beyond New England's borders 
and was not able to prevent entry by nonestablished competitors, particularly after the rev­
olution. Historians use the tenn "Puritan tribalism" to describe the tightly knit New 
England communities centered on the church (Moran 1979, 1991, 1993). These commu­
nities and their churches exist even today and on each of the church's membership roles 
are descendants of the families present when the congregation was gathered. Our data on 
new membership show that the Puritan church did a good job ofproviding religious prod­
ucts to what eventually became a very narrow national market segment. 
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Dummy variable set to one for years from the bottom of each economic cycle in 
the colonies to the top of the cycle. The variable equals zero for years from the 
top to the bottom of a cycle. The data were developed by John McCusker and 
Russell Menard (1985) 
Great Awakening 
Dummy variable set to one for 1741 and 1742. 
New Members per 1000 Population 
Estimated number of new members of Puritan congregations per one thousand 
population in Connecticut. Connecticut population is interpolated from decadal 
estimates of Connecticut white and African American population, U.S., 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1975). 
Nonestablished Congregations 
The number of Separatist, Baptist, and Anglican (Episcopalian) congregations as 
compiled by Goen (1969). 
Year 
Annual observations numbered in sequence from 1 (1670) to 106 (1776). 
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